Venezuela said it had formally notified the United Nations of its withdrawal from the Rome Statute following instructions from Interim President Delcy Rodriguez, with Foreign Minister Felix Plasencia describing the decision as firm and irrevocable in a public post. Venezuela framed the move as a response to perceived ICC geographical bias, with Plasencia arguing the court disproportionately targeted Africa and Latin America. The United States publicly welcomed Venezuela’s decision, with the US Department of State praising Rodriguez and urging other ICC member states to withdraw from the Rome Statute. The US statement also referenced the ICC’s years-long investigation into former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and characterized it as producing no result.
The ICC indicated it had not yet received formal notification through the UN treaty office at the time of the developments described. Under the Rome Statute, withdrawal takes effect one year after notification and does not affect investigations already under way or matters already before the court. The ICC investigation into Venezuela opened in 2021 after prosecutors found a reasonable basis to believe security forces and pro-government groups committed crimes against humanity during a crackdown on anti-government protests beginning in 2017.
Thousands of Venezuelan victims have submitted testimony to the ICC, often at personal risk. Civil society advocates warned that attacks on the court, including US sanctions against ICC judges and prosecutors, increased fears of retaliation and made cases harder to advance. Although withdrawal will not end the Venezuela investigation, analysts said it signals that Caracas is unlikely to cooperate. Many officials covered by the investigation remain in office, and several have been promoted.
Chad announced that it had begun the withdrawal process, making it the fifth state since September 2025 to announce plans to leave the court. Chad’s military government described the court’s effectiveness as limited and uneven and criticized what it described as a concentration of ICC activity on African countries. According to Chad’s government, nine of 13 investigations opened by the court concerned African states, while four concerned other regions. Chad’s decision followed withdrawals announced by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in September 2025, with those Sahel states accusing the court of selective justice. Chad’s Foreign Ministry said its decision followed a request from Washington to review its membership in the court.
These moves occurred amid intensified US pressure after the ICC issued arrest warrants in 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington would pursue a campaign to “systematically disable” the court’s ability to operate. ICC member states also dismissed elected chief prosecutor Karim Khan over allegations of sexual misconduct, which he denied. Netanyahu welcomed Khan’s dismissal and said he had spoken with Rubio, who reaffirmed US determination to act against the court.
The near-simultaneous moves by Venezuela and Chad add to signs of fragmentation in the international legal order, with implications for deterrence, accountability, and diplomatic leverage. Withdrawal does not end the court’s jurisdiction over existing investigations, but it can weaken the cooperation needed to collect evidence, conduct inquiries, and enforce warrants. This shifts the balance from legal constraint toward political bargaining, especially where implicated officials remain in power and can interpret withdrawal as reduced personal risk.
Geopolitical competition is central to the pattern. The United States is not merely expressing skepticism toward the ICC; it is applying overt political pressure and encouraging exits. That posture converts ICC membership into a geopolitical alignment marker rather than a neutral legal commitment. For governments seeking improved relations with Washington, withdrawal can become a signal of alignment. For governments wary of Western influence, the same dynamic reinforces narratives of selective justice and external coercion. Either way, the institution’s legitimacy becomes contested through power politics rather than adjudication.
The Chad case also illustrates how regional blocs and regime types can amplify institutional erosion. Multiple Sahel military governments have already announced exits, and Chad’s military government is now following. This creates a contagion risk: once withdrawal becomes normalized among peer regimes, remaining members could face increased domestic and regional pressure to follow, particularly when the court is framed as uneven or politically weaponized. The practical effect is a shrinking enforcement coalition, which reduces the credibility of arrest warrants and weakens the deterrent value of international criminal accountability.
The ICC’s internal turbulence compounds the external pressure. The dismissal of the elected chief prosecutor amid misconduct allegations creates an opening for adversaries to argue that the institution is dysfunctional. When prominent ICC targets publicly welcome the dismissal and connect it to conversations with US officials, they may reinforce perceptions that the court is entangled in wider political struggles. That perception can discourage victim participation and reduce the willingness of states to share evidence, execute warrants, or host ICC operations.
Taken together, these developments indicate a broader shift: international institutions designed to constrain state behavior are increasingly accepted or abandoned according to immediate strategic advantage. This trend makes international justice less predictable and weakens the ICC’s ability to secure evidence, execute warrants, and protect participating victims. Over time, accountability could depend more on bilateral pressure and transactional diplomacy than on durable multilateral commitments.
